Abstract

The position that "technology is neutral" is shown to consist of two claims: that technological objects are not in themselves sufficient to produce any specific effects, and that artifacts are not sufficient to produce any specific good or bad effects. When the ambiguity of the phrase "use of an artifact" is uncovered, the first position is found to be only partly correct. It is shown that artifacts determine the forms of the actions that users must perform in order to use them for any purpose, and thus artifacts are not causally neutral. Adding to this the claim that the acts of using artifacts can directly make favorable or unfavorable differences in the lives of the users independent of any further consequences of those acts, shows that the position that artifacts are value-neutral is false. ;The position that "technology is not neutral" is analyzed into four distinct claims One claim is that artifacts are expressions of value-judgments and thus are not value-neutral. This is shown to be correct, but inadequate as an objection to neutralism. A second claim is that not all artifacts are flexible with regard to the purposes they serve. This view succeeds in refuting neutralism as a universal generalization about the flexibility of artifacts regarding purposes served, but it must allow that some artifacts do possess such flexibility. A third claim is that some artifacts enhance or impede humans' ability to control their own lives, and in this way are not politically neutral. This is shown to be correct, and to be a narrower version of the second non-neutralist position. A final non-neutralist claim is that specific artifacts require, as necessary conditions of their operation, the existence of specific social relations in the organizations within which they are deployed. This claim is shown to be false as a universal generalization. Studies indicate that there is considerable freeplay in the structure of work organizations given the choice of particular artifacts