Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag (2018)

Abstract
This monograph examines truth in fiction by applying the techniques of a naturalized logic of human cognitive practices. The author structures his project around two focal questions. What would it take to write a book about truth in literary discourse with reasonable promise of getting it right? What would it take to write a book about truth in fiction as true to the facts of lived literary experience as objectivity allows? It is argued that the most semantically distinctive feature of the sentences of fiction is that they areunambiguously true and false together. It is true that Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street and also concurrently false that he did. A second distinctive feature of fiction is that the reader at large knows of this inconsistency and isn’t in the least cognitively molested by it. Why, it is asked, would this be so? What would explain it? Two answers are developed. According to the no-contradiction thesis, the semantically tangled sentences of fiction are indeed logically inconsistent but not logically contradictory. According to the no-bother thesis, if the inconsistencies of fiction were contradictory, a properly contrived logic for the rational management of inconsistency would explain why readers at large are not thrown off cognitive stride by their embrace of those contradictions. As developed here, the account of fiction suggests the presence of an underlying three - or four-valued dialethic logic. The author shows this to be a mistaken impression. There are only two truth-values in his logic of fiction. The naturalized logic of Truth in Fiction jettisons some of the standard assumptions and analytical tools of contemporary philosophy, chiefly because the neurotypical linguistic and cognitive behaviour of humanity at large is at variance with them. Using the resources of a causal response epistemology in tandem with the naturalized logic, the theory produced here is data-driven, empirically sensitive, and open to a circumspect collaboration with the empirical sciences of language and cognition.
Keywords abduction
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Buy this book $70.66 new   Amazon page
ISBN(s) 9783319726571   978-3-319-72657-1   978-3-319-72658-8   3319726579   3030102459   9783319726588
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-72658-8
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,979
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
Chapters BETA

References found in this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
On Referring.Peter F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.
On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:5-20.

View all 89 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Impossible Fictions Part I: Lessons for Fiction.Daniel Nolan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (2):1-12.
Exploding Stories and the Limits of Fiction.Michel-Antoine Xhignesse - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):675-692.
How in the World?Stephen Yablo - 1996 - In Christopher Hill (ed.), Philosophical Topics. University of Arkansas Press. pp. 255--86.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Truth and Reference in Fiction.Stavroula Glezakos - 2012 - In Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
According to the Fiction. A Metaexpressivist Account.Daniel Dohrn - 2015 - Proceedings of the European Society of Aesthetics 7.
Fiction Cannot Be True.László Kajtár - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2167-2186.
Explicitism About Truth in Fiction.William D’Alessandro - 2016 - British Journal of Aesthetics 56 (1):53-65.
Judgment in Fiction.David Ryan - 2002 - South African Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):63-82.
Truth in Fiction: A Theory of Aesthetic Relevance.Noel Houston Tisdale - 1983 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
Truth, Relativism, and Serial Fiction.Andrew McGonigal - 2013 - British Journal of Aesthetics 53 (2):165-179.
Much Ado About Nonexistence: Fiction and Reference.Hatem Rushdy (ed.) - 2007 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
The Matter of Serial Fiction.Chris Tillman - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (2):425-439.
Fiction and Acceptance-Relative Truth, Belief and Assertion.R. M. Sainsbury - 2011 - In Franck Lihoreau (ed.), Truth in Fiction. Ontos Verlag. pp. 38--137.
A Bad Theory of Truth in Fiction.Ioan-Radu Motoarc? - 2017 - British Journal of Aesthetics 57 (4):379-387.
Contexts, Fiction and Truth.Alberto Voltolini - 2013 - In A. Capone, M. Carapezza & F. Lo Piparo (eds.), Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy. Springer. pp. 489-500.
Much Ado About Nonexistence: Fiction and Reference.Avrum Stroll (ed.) - 2007 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Truth in Fiction.David K. Postscripts to Lewis - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):37--46.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-01-25

Total views
30 ( #380,845 of 2,505,146 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,587 of 2,505,146 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes