Deleuze and Guatarri Studies 9 (2):231-256 (2015)

Ashley Woodward
Dundee University
This paper mounts a philosophical defence of Peter Shaffer's 1973 play Equus by interpreting it from three perspectives: that of Freud, Jung, and Deleuze and Guattari. The latter's concept of becoming-animal is offered as a leading perspective which reveals the deep philosophical significance of the drama, belying the claims of those critics who have dismissed it as bogus or banal. This interpretation also allows Equus to be seen as an exemplary illustration of what Deleuze and Guattari mean by their intriguing concept of becoming-animal, and throws fresh light on this fascinating but difficult notion.
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DOI 10.3366/dls.2015.0184
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References found in this work BETA

The Exhausted.Gilles Deleuze & Anthony Uhlmann - 1995 - Substance 24 (3):3.
Deleuze and Performance.Laura Cull (ed.) - 2009 - Edinburgh University Press.

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