Adverbialism, the many-property problem, and inference: reply to Grzankowski

Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):312-324 (2021)
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Abstract

A serious problem for adverbialism about intentionality is the many-property problem, one major aspect of which is the claim that natural inferences between thought contents are blocked if adverbia...

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10.1080/13869795.2021.1923783

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Casey Woodling
Coastal Carolina University

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.

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