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The Classical Review 46 (01):9-11 (1932)
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10.1017/s0009840x00057474

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High-Level Explanation and the Interventionist’s ‘Variables Problem’.L. R. Franklin-Hall - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (2):553-577.
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