Abstract

My dissertation is a study of Plotinus' claim that the forms are not only internal to but even in some sense are Intellect. In part I, I discuss Plotinus' methodology. In part II, I analyze his arguments for the internality and identity theses, consider their consequences, and conclude that Plotinus is an idealist. In part III, I provide a translation of Ennead V.3, Plotinus' last account of these theses. In part IV, I present a commentary on V.3. ;In V.3, Plotinus analyzes self-knowing, arguing that Intellect must know itself absolutely. He then argues that the forms are internal to Intellect and in some sense are Intellect. In the first part of my analysis I follow Plotinus' own order. ;In analyzing his arguments for Intellect's self-knowledge, I introduce certain useful concepts: intentional relations and reflexive intentional relations, the internal and the external object of a mental state, and idealism, direct realism, and representational realism. Next, I use certain distinctions to analyze his arguments that the forms are Intellect: I distinguish different ways in which forms can exist and relate these ways to idealism, direct realism, and representational realism. ;Thereafter, I show how Plotinus concludes that the forms are Intellect and discuss in what sense the forms are Intellect and what this identity entails. Then I deal with problems concerning the Intellect's genesis and structure, such as nonpropositional thinking and forms of individuals. Finally, I argue that Plotinus is a kind of idealist. ;Part IV, the commentary, allows me to focus upon passages in V.3 that are relevant to my analysis. I analyze these passages both philosophically and philologically