Sutton, John. Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 54 (2):459-461 (2000)
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Abstract

This book will be valuable predominantly to specialists who are already familiar with the literature on the subject. It bristles with scholarly references, and includes a 43 page bibliography. Sutton’s approach is an interdisciplinary one, drawing on cognitive science, medicine, and neurophysiology as well as literature, psychology, and philosophy. The purpose of the book is to describe and defend a set of theories of autobiographical memory, both historical and contemporary, which view memories as dynamic patterns rather than static archives, fragmentary traces to be reconstructed rather than coherent things to be reproduced.

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