An Argument for a Substantively Weak-Dialogical Approach to Autonomy

International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 12 (1):99-118 (2019)
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Abstract

This paper proposes a novel relational view of autonomy designed to overcome the inadequacies of procedural and substantive views of autonomy as they relate to physician-assisted suicide requests for individuals with diminished cognitive functioning. Traditional and other relational views of autonomy regard a patient as an “isolated monad,” ignore patients with limited personal autonomy, and overlook the contexts in which decisions like PAS are made. However, these weaknesses become the strengths of a synthesized relational view of autonomy, which enhances the personal autonomy of those with limited personal autonomy so that their PAS requests can be granted.

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References found in this work

Personal Autonomy and Society.Marina A. L. Oshana - 1998 - Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (1):81-102.
Relational autonomy, normative authority and perfectionism.Catriona Mackenzie - 2008 - Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (4):512-533.

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