Abstract

A piece of metaphilosophy which seeks to assimilate metaphysical assumptions to religious faith conceived as an ungrounded, yet necessary, attitude of "trust of orientation" toward "what is taken to be ultimate." Dilley claims that "philosophical fragmentation is the rule; hence attention has turned to the reasons for philosophical pluralism, and one of the reasons which has become increasingly obvious is the confessional character of metaphysical theories." We find this supported by the usual convenient, if uncomfortable, alliance between positivism and Tillichian theology, buttressed by snatches or arguments from dozens of metaphilosophers, philosophers, metatheologians and theologians, such as Carnap, Whitehead, Lazerowitz, Barth, Buber, and Hick. The irrational clutter of authorities doesn't quite conceal the argument's lack of foundations, philosophical or theological. But there is a consistency between the thesis and the mode of argument. Attitudes are notoriously chaotic, unreflective, and possibly inconsistent mental states which we try to clarify, straighten out, order, and ground through thought. Perhaps we would be asking for a self-refutation to require this task of Dilley.—W. G. E.