What Am I and What Am I Doing?

Journal of Philosophy 114 (10):536-550 (2017)
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There is a deep connection between Anscombe’s argument that ‘I’ is not a referring expression and Intention’s account of practical knowledge and knowledge without observation. The assumption that the so-called “no-reference thesis” can be resisted while the account of action set out in her book INTENTION is embraced is based on a misunderstanding of the argument of “The First Person” and the status of its conclusion; removing that misunderstanding helps to illuminate the concept of practical knowledge and brings into view a novel account of the relation between self-consciousness, agency, and first-person thought.



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Rachael Wiseman
University of Liverpool

Citations of this work

IV—Wittgenstein, Anscombe and the Need for Metaphysical Thinking.Rachael Wiseman - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (2):71-95.
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Knowledge of Language as Self-Knowledge.John Schwenkler - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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