Abstract

Because of their use of the idea of neutrality to discuss the relationship between religion and politics, political philosophers writing in the liberal tradition have frequently been subjected to the charge that liberalism is at best indifferent and at worst hostile to religiously based moral argument. However, such criticism of liberals ignores promising theoretical developments in two strands of contemporary liberal thought: political liberalism and deliberative democracy. By applying the idea of neutrality only to state action--and not to the moral deliberation of citizens--political liberals can address some of the trenchant arguments of their religious and communitarian critics. ;In place of the principle of discursive neutrality, the liberal duty of civility developed here is a more promising way both to remain true to the valid liberal distinction between public and private spheres, and to allow full and robust political participation by citizens whose political lives are profoundly informed by religious insight. Liberals should ground such a duty in a respect for the full moral capacities of citizens, the liberal principle of legitimacy, and in John Rawls's idea of the burdens of judgment--a firm sense on the part of citizens that political disagreement stems not only from ignorance or moral failure, but from the nature of collective reflection on political problems, which always feature the eventual threat of coercion. In further developing these aspects of political liberal and deliberative democratic theory, this dissertation seeks to make possible civil and vigorous moral discourse in the liberal polity.