Information and structure in molecular biology: Comments on Maynard Smith

Philosophy of Science 67 (3):517-526 (2000)
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Abstract

In a recent essay in this journal, John Maynard Smith argues that the often expressed idea that the genome is the repository of meaningful information is not merely a heuristically useful metaphor. Instead, he contends, it is a central idea in contemporary microbiology. While I am in general agreement with Maynard Smith on this issue, his account suffers, I believe, from using an inappropriate concept of ‘information.’ One result of this is that the concept of genomic information becomes burdened by a conceptual load that the biological facts cannot support. When, however, the appropriate concept of information is used, then these burdens are shed, and the result is an account that is in substantial agreement with the heart of Maynard Smith's thesis.

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