Abstract
Emerson said that idealism sees the world in God: not as “painfully accumulated, atom after atom, act after act, in a aged creeping Past,” but as “a vast picture” painted by God “on the instant eternity.” Emerson’s portrait fits A.C. Grayling’s Berkeley, who sees the world in an infinite spirit whose power is unfailing and ubiquitous. Berkeley’s arguments, Grayling suggests, move at three levels, and at the metaphysical level, God’s activity accounts for what occurs at the level of sensory experience and at “the level of ordinary thought and talk about everyday experience and its objects”. Level 3 explanations invoking matter, violate Berkeley’s “austere constraints” on “sensefulness”. Grayling himself accepts these constraints. This permits him to conclude that although Berkeley cannot establish the God his level 3 accout requires, his claim that the esse of sensible things is percipi is “substantially defensible”.