Philosophical Studies 180 (1):363–84 (2023)
AbstractA long line of epistemologists including Sosa (2021), Feldman (2002), and Chisholm (1977) have argued that, at least for a certain class of questions that we take up, we should (or should aim to) close inquiry iff by closing inquiry we would meet a unique epistemic standard. I argue that no epistemic norm of this general form is true: there is not a single epistemic standard that demarcates the boundary between inquiries we are forbidden and obligated to close. In short, such norms are false because they are insensitive to the potentially ambitious epistemic goals that agents may permissibly bring to bear on an inquiry. Focusing particularly on knowledge-oriented versions of the norm, I argue that ignorance has a positive role to play in epistemic life by licensing prolonged inquiry into questions that we especially care about.
Similar books and articles
Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswick
On the Relation Between Ignorance and Epistemic Injustice: An ignorance-first analysis.Zara Bain - 2022 - In Linsey McGoey & Matthias Gross (eds.), Routledge International Handbook of Ignorance Studies. London, UK: pp. 47-60.
Lucky Ignorance, Modality and Lack of Knowledge.Oscar A. Piedrahita - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (3).
How we fail to know: Group-based ignorance and collective epistemic obligations.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2022 - Political Studies 70 (4):901-918.
Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition.Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pluralistic Ignorance : A Case for Social Epistemology and Epistemic Logic.Jens Ulrik Hansen - unknown
Vice, Blameworthiness and Cultural Ignorance.Elinor Mason & Alan T. Wilson - 2017 - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press. pp. 82-100.
Privileged Ignorance, “World”-Traveling, and Epistemic Tourism.Melanie Bowman - 2020 - Hypatia 35 (3):475-489.
Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry.Yasha Sapir & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5837-5859.
Ignorance and Epistemic Contextualism.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2016 - In Rik Peels & Martijn Blaauw (eds.), The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 96-113.
The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance.Rik Peels & Martijn Blaauw (eds.) - 2016 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Democracy and ignorance: Reply to Friedman.Robert B. Talisse - 2006 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 18 (4):453-466.
A working hypothesis for the logic of radical ignorance.Vincenzo Fano & Pierluigi Graziani - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):601-616.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):463-484.
References found in this work
White Ignorance.Charles W. Mills - 2007 - In Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana (eds.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. Albany, NY: State Univ of New York Pr. pp. 11-38.