The Form and Function of Joint Attention within Joint Action

Philosophical Psychology 36 (1):134-161 (2023)
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Abstract

Joint attention is an everyday phenomenon in which two or more individuals attend to an object, event process or property in the presence of each other, such that their attention to that object is to some degree intertwined with the other’s attention to it. This paper argues that joint attention has the normative role of enabling subjects to coordinate their actions in a way that would contribute to the rational execution of a joint action in accordance with a prior shared plan or shared intention. This understanding of the normative function of joint attention underpins a particular understanding of the nature of joint attention: what I shall call Rich Relationalism. Rich Relationalism argues for the view that joint attention acts as an epistemically significant interface between the world, other people, and their background plans and concepts. It understands joint attention as an object-dependent, conceptually structured, token experiential state that is shared by two (or more) people. It can be contrasted with non-relational (i.e., Representational or Enactivist) accounts of joint attention on the one hand, and Lean Relationalist accounts on the other (such as John Campbell’s influential account).

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Michael Wilby
Anglia Ruskin University

References found in this work

Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Individuals.P. F. Strawson - 1959 - Garden City, N.Y.: Routledge.
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Individuals.P. F. Strawson - 1959 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 14 (2):246-246.
The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.

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