The absurdities of Moore's paradoxes

Theoria 48 (1):38-46 (1982)
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Abstract

The absurdity of (i) and (ii) arises because asserting 'p' normally expresses a belief that p. Normally, when (i) is asserted, what is conjointly expressed and asserted, i.e. a belief that p and a lack of belief that p, is logically impossible, whereas normally, when (ii) is asserted, it is differently absurd, since what is conjointly expressed and asserted, i.e. a belief that p and a belief that -p, is logically possible, but inconsistent. A possible source of confusion between 'impossible' and 'inconsistent' is the fact that a proposition which is inconsistent tout court is always self-contradictory and hence necessarily false, unlike one which is inconsistent with other propositions. Whereas the proposition Ibp&-Ibp is inconsistent, the proposition IBp &IB-p is not. I cannot hold a belief which I lack, but I can..

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John N. Williams
Singapore Management University

Citations of this work

Moorean absurdities and the nature of assertion.John N. Williams - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):135 – 149.
The preface paradox dissolved.John N. Williams - 1987 - Theoria 53 (2-3):121-140.
Moore's many paradoxes.Mitchell S. Green - 1999 - Philosophical Papers 28 (2):97-109.

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References found in this work

A reply to my critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York,: Tudor Pub. Co..
Knowledge---by examples.Colin Radford - 1966 - Analysis 27 (1):1--11.
Knowledge: By Examples.Colin Radford - 1966 - Analysis 27 (1):1.
Saying and Disbelieving.Max Black - 1952 - Analysis 13 (2):25-33.
Moore's Paradox: One or Two?J. N. Williams - 1979 - Analysis 39 (3):141 - 142.

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