Abstract

Whether abortion and infanticide are permissible has been debated for a long time in philosophical literature and continues to this day. In this paper, I will assume without argument that one’s view about the moral status of the fetus and newborn will determine what side he/she comes down on in this debate. I am also proceeding with the assumption that personhood is not a conventional or linguistically effective device that has little or no connection to reality. Persons exist and personhood itself is real. With that being said, I will defend a more controversial claim that will undoubtedly stir a hornet’s nest. This will be stated succinctly but will be defended in greater detail throughout the paper: If the fetus and newborn are not persons, then abortion and infanticide are permissible. If a 3-year-old child is a person but to a lesser degree than a 14-year-old, then the 3-year-old child’s moral status is lower than the 14-year old’s. If no adequate threshold exists conjoined with the fact of metaphysical disparity among human beings that are persons, then no two human persons are moral equals.