- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Motivating objective bayesianism: From empirical constraints to objective probabilities
Abstract
Kyburg goes half-way towards objective Bayesianism. He accepts that frequencies constrain rational belief to an interval but stops short of isolating an optimal degree of belief within this interval. I examine the case for going the whole hog.Author's Profile
Links
PhilArchive
External links
(no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Only published works are available at libraries.
My notes
Similar books and articles
Two dogmas of strong objective bayesianism.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Gordon Brittan - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):45 – 65.
Bayesian decision theory, subjective and objective probabilities, and acceptance of empirical hypotheses.John C. Harsanyi - 1983 - Synthese 57 (3):341 - 365.
On the definition of objective probabilities by empirical similarity.Itzhak Gilboa, Offer Lieberman & David Schmeidler - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):79 - 95.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
99 (#169,458)
6 months
11 (#196,102)
2009-01-28
Downloads
99 (#169,458)
6 months
11 (#196,102)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):236-272.
Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference.Jan Sprenger - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (2):319-335.
Probabilistic Logics and Probabilistic Networks.Rolf Haenni, Jan-Willem Romeijn, Gregory Wheeler & Jon Williamson - 2010 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Synthese Library. Edited by Gregory Wheeler, Rolf Haenni, Jan-Willem Romeijn & and Jon Williamson.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-7c76586df8-l2pxr uwo