Logical norms, accuracy and degree of belief

In Colin R. Caret & Ole Thomassen Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence. Oxford University Press (2015)
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Robert Williams
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References found in this work

Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.
How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.
Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.

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