Theory and Decision 45 (3):201-240 (1998)

Abstract
This paper proposes a revised Theory of Moves (TOM) to analyze matrix games between two players when payoffs are given as ordinals. The games are analyzed when a given player i must make the first move, when there is a finite limit n on the total number of moves, and when the game starts at a given initial state S. Games end when either both players pass in succession or else a total of n moves have been made. Studies are made of the influence of i, n, and S on the outcomes. It is proved that these outcomes ultimately become periodic in n and therefore exhibit long-term predictable behavior. Efficient algorithms are given to calculate these ultimate outcomes by computer. Frequently the ultimate outcomes are independent of i, S, and n when n is sufficiently large; in this situation this common ultimate outcome is proved to be Pareto-optimal. The use of ultimate outcomes gives rise to a concept of stable points, which are analogous to Nash equilibria but consider long-term effects. If the initial state is a stable point, then no player has an incentive to move from that state, under the assumption that any initial move could be followed by a long series of moves and countermoves. The concept may be broadened to that of a stable set. It is proved that every game has a minimal stable set, and any two distinct minimal stable sets are disjoint. Comparisons are made with the results of standard TOM
Keywords Game theory  Noncooperative games  Theory of Moves (TOM)  Prisoner's Dilemma  Stable set
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DOI 10.1023/A:1004946714084
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References found in this work BETA

Equilibria for Far-Sighted Players.D. Marc Kilgour - 1984 - Theory and Decision 16 (2):135-157.
Limited-Move Equilibria in 2 X 2 Games.Frank C. Zagare - 1984 - Theory and Decision 16 (1):1.

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