Abstract

This is a very important book for Kantian practical philosophy, because it defends the essential consistency and coherence of Kant's transcendental idealism and his moral philosophy. At the same time, Allison's careful textual work along with his account of Kant's transcendental distinction between the intelligible and empirical character of human agency helps to clarify passages which have plagued some of the best interpreters of Kant's practical philosophy, such as Lewis White Beck and Allen Wood. Allison's primary objective is to give a defense of Kant's incompatibilist conception of freedom which "constitutes the common thread running through all three critiques". Although he succeeds in this objective, because of his insightful and scholarly argumentation, one is still left with many questions concerning the relationship between the "two points of views" of freedom and mechanism in Kantian moral philosophy, and Allison admits he has not resolved this.