If we accept that Mary the colour scientist gains new knowledge when she sees the colour red for the first time must this lead us to a non-physicalist theory of consciousness?

PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 16 (1):12-15 (2010)
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Abstract

A common and popular option in defending Physicalism against the Knowledge Argument is the “phenomenal concept strategy” . PCS claims that, although ex hypothesi Mary knows all the propositions pertaining to color and experiences of color, there is at least space for the claim that she acquires a new concept, and thereby accesses these propositions under different, phenomenal modes of presentation. In short, Mary acquires new concepts upon her release and that explains her “discovery.” Here I will show there is a way of saving Physicalism that does not appeal to PCS in the standard sense but entails that Mary acquires the ability to think a new kind of singular thought. In acquiring this, she gains a kind of indexical, egocentric knowledge

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The components of content.David Chalmers - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
Is sense transparent?John Campbell - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:273-292.

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