Interventionist Explanation and the Problem of Single Variable Boundary Constraints

Noûs 54 (4):945-955 (2019)
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Abstract

According to Interventionism, explanations cite invariant relations which hold among multiple variables. Interventionism incorrectly implies, however, that many common scientific explanations—which cite single‐variable boundary constraints—are not actually explanatory. So I propose a different account of explanation, similar in spirit to Interventionism, which gets those cases of scientific explanation right.

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Isaac Wilhelm
National University of Singapore

Citations of this work

Against relationalism about modality.Carlos Romero - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (8):2245-2274.

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References found in this work

Time and Chance.David Z. Albert - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Interventionist counterfactuals.Rachael Briggs - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):139-166.
High-Level Explanation and the Interventionist’s ‘Variables Problem’.L. R. Franklin-Hall - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (2):553-577.
Time and Chance.S. French - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):113-116.

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