Implicature, Appropriateness and Warranted Assertability

ProtoSociology 26:241-261 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In a number of papers, Keith DeRose articulates his reasons for thinking that we cannot plausibly explain the mechanics of knowledge attribution in terms of varying conditions of warranted assertability (1998, 2002). His reasoning is largely comparative: “know,” he argues, proves a poor candidate for such a diagnosis when compared to other terms to which such warranted assertabilility maneuvers (i.e., WAMs) clearly apply. More specifically, DeRose aims, through to use of such comparative case studies, to identify several general principles through which we might determine when WAMs are called for. In what follows, I take issue with one of these principles and argue that DeRose’s efforts to deploy the others to pro-contextualist (i.e., anti-invariantist) ends are misguided. I conclude by examining DeRose’s specific objection to Unger’s skeptical invariantism, and identify a problematic feature of his recurrent appeals to linguistic intuition. The payoff of this is an enhanced appreciation of the factors on which the contextualist/invariantist dispute should be seen to turn.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,227

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Classic invariantism, relevance and warranted assertability manœvres.Tim Black - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):328–336.
WAMs: Why Worry?Peter Baumann - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (2):155 - 177.
Some worries for would-be WAMmers.Adam Leite - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):101-126.
Warranted assertability maneuvers and the rules of assertion.Leo Iacono - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):460-469.
Contextualism, Skepticism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. Mit Press. pp. 85-104.
Contextualism and warranted assertibility manoeuvres.Jessica Brown - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435.
Constructive logic, truth and warranted assertability.Greg Restall - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):474-483.
Contesting contextualism.Patrick Rysiew - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):51-70.
Modal Stability and Warrant.Colin P. Ruloff - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):173-188.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-01-31

Downloads
20 (#771,402)

6 months
4 (#798,951)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ronald Wilburn
University of Calgary

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references