Abstract

Jean-Paul Sartre states in Being and Nothingness that an intersubjective relationship occurs when the for-itself experiences a look, that is, experiences its being-for-other. According to Sartre, all such appearances are always experienced negatively. The aim of the thesis is to explore this Sartrean claim from two perspectives: that of consciousness and that of relation. Chapter One, Consciousness of the Other, delimits the encounter with the Other and the influence that Husserl, Hegel, and Heidegger had on Sartre. Chapter Two, Consciousness as Relation, reveals the identity of the Other and the Sartrean assertion that one's concrete relations with the Other are governed by one's attitudes towards the object which one is for the Other. Though Sartre may not have set out to suggest that all intersubjective relationships are always with oneself from a negative perspective, his premises in Being and Nothingness nevertheless imply just that. Chapter Three of the thesis is an attempt to present a fair judgment of Sartre's peculiar position. Dept. of Philosophy. Paper copy at Leddy Library: Theses & Major Papers - Basement, West Bldg. / Call Number: Thesis1990.W556. Source: Masterss International, Volume: 30-03, page: 0498. Chair: Harry A. Nielsen. Thesis --University of Windsor, 1990.