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Circular arguments
Metaphilosophy 19 (1):38–52 (1988)
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Citations of this work
Epistemic and Dialectical Models of Begging the Question.Douglas Walton - 2006 - Synthese 152 (2):237-284.
Begging the Question in Arguments Based on Testimony.Douglas Walton - 2005 - Argumentation 19 (1):85-113.
Petitio principii and circular argumentation as seen from a theory of dialectical structures.Gregor Betz - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):327-349.
Both Wittgenstein and Kant Beg the Question.Jing Li - 2018 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (1):61-65.
References found in this work
Superfluous information, epistemic conditions of inference, and begging the question.DavidH Sanford - 1981 - Metaphilosophy 12 (2):145–158.
Superfluous Information, Epistemic Conditions of Inference, and Begging the Question.DavidH Sanford - 1981 - Metaphilosophy 12 (2):145-158.
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