Aristotelian indeterminacy and the open future

Abstract

I explore the thesis that the future is open, in the sense that future contingents are neither true nor false. The paper is divided into three sections. In the first, I survey how the thesis arises on a variety of contemporary views on the metaphysics of time. In the second, I explore the consequences for rational belief of the ‘Aristotelian’ view that indeterminacy is characterized by truth-value gaps. In the third, I outline one line of defence for the Aristotelian against the puzzles this induces: treating opinion about future contingents as a matter of fictional belief rather than simple belief.

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2009-01-28

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Author's Profile

Robert Williams
University of Leeds

References found in this work

Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - London and New York: Routledge.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.

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Citations of this work

The Open Future, Bivalence and Assertion.Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):251-271.

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