Externalism and incomplete understanding

Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):287-294 (2004)
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Abstract

Sarah Sawyer has challenged my claim that social externalism depends on the assumption that individuals have an incomplete grasp of their own concepts. Sawyer denies that Burge's later sofa thought-experiment relies on this assumption: the unifying principle behind the thought-experiments supporting social externalism, she argues, is just that referents play a role in the individuation of concepts. I argue that Sawyer fails to show that social externalism need not rely on the assumption of incomplete understanding. To establish the content externalist conclusions, further considerations are required, and these do commit the externalist to the assumption of incomplete understanding

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Asa Maria Wikforss
Stockholm University

Citations of this work

Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism.Åsa Wikforss - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):158-181.
Wittgensteinian content‐externalism.Ben Sorgiovanni - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):110-125.
Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Content.Åsa Maria Wikforss - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):399-424.
Mind, Modality, and Meaning: Toward a Rationalist Physicalism.Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2013 - Dissertation, University of California Los Angeles

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References found in this work

Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Other bodies.Tyler Burge - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Intellectual norms and foundations of mind.Tyler Burge - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (December):697-720.
Wherein is language social?Tyler Burge - 1989 - In A. George (ed.), Reflections on Chomsky. Blackwell. pp. 175--191.

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