Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2):490-510 (2017)

Authors
Isaac Wiegman
Texas State University
Abstract
Recent empirical work suggests that emotions are responsible for anti-consequentialist intuitions. For instance, anger places value on actions of revenge and retribution, value not derived from the consequences of these actions. As a result, it contributes to the development of retributive intuitions. I argue that if anger evolved to produce these retributive intuitions because of their biological consequences, then these intuitions are not a good indicator that punishment has value apart from its consequences. This severs the evidential connection between retributive intuitions and the retributive value of punishment. This argument may generalize to other deontological intuitions and theories.
Keywords Evolutionary debunking argument  Retributivism  Deontology  Intuition  Emotion  Moral judgment
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1111/papq.12083
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References found in this work BETA

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
The Emotions.Nico H. Frijda - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Experimental Moral Philosophy.Mark Alfano, Don Loeb & Alex Plakias - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-32.
Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12).
Experimental Moral Philosophy.Mark Alfano & Don Loeb - 2014 - In Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Debunking (the) Retribution (Gap).Steven R. Kraaijeveld - 2019 - Science and Engineering Ethics:1-14.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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