Lying, Deceptive Implicatures, and Commitment

Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Deceptive implicatures are a subtle communicative device for leading someone into a false belief. However, it is widely accepted that deceiving by means of deceptive implicature does not amount to lying. In this paper, we put this claim to the empirical test and present evidence that the traditional definition of lying might be too narrow to capture the folk concept of lying. Four hundred participants were presented with fourteen vignettes containing utterances that communicate conversational implicatures which the speaker believes to be false. We further collected several potential proxy measures of lying, to get a better understanding of when a deceptive implicature is considered a case of lying. The results indicate that most implicatures (ten out of fourteen) were evaluated as lies and that lie ratings were closely tracked by the degree to which speakers were considered to have committed themselves to the truth of the content conveyed by their deceptive implicatures.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 97,154

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Bending and Stretching the Definition of Lying.Martina Blečić - 2020 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):247-256.
Lying with Conditionals.Roy Sorensen - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):820-832.
Lying with Uninformative Speech Acts.Grzegorz Gaszczyk - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (7):746-760.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-01-05

Downloads
54 (#315,911)

6 months
38 (#115,096)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Alex Wiegmann
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Pascale Willemsen
University of Zürich

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references