Philosophies 6 (18):18 (2021)

A weak version of life-mind continuity thesis entails that every living system also has a basic mind. The strong version entails that the same concepts that are sufficient to explain basic minds are also central to understanding non-basic minds. We argue that recent work on the free energy principle supports the following claims with respect to the life-mind continuity thesis: there is a strong continuity between life and mind; all living systems can be described as if they had representational states; the ’as-if representationality’ entailed by the free energy principle is central to understanding both basic forms of intentionality and intentionality in non-basic minds. In addition to this, we argue that the free energy principle also renders realism about computation and representation compatible with a strong life-mind continuity thesis. In particular, we show how representationality proper can be grounded in ’as-if representationality’.
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DOI 10.3390/philosophies6010018
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References found in this work BETA

The Self‐Evidencing Brain.Jakob Hohwy - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):259-285.
Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.

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