Theory of mind in non-verbal apes: Conceptual issues and the critical experiments

In D. Walsh (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 199-223 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX


It is now over twenty years since Premack and Woodruff posed the question, ‘Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?’—‘by which we meant’, explained Premack in a later reappraisal, ‘does the ape do what humans do: attribute states of mind to the other one, and use these states to predict and explain the behaviour of the other one? For example, does the ape wonder, while looking quizzically at another individual, What does he really want? What does he believe? What are his intentions? '



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,088

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles


Added to PP

41 (#350,262)

6 months
2 (#785,137)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations