Semantic normativity, properly so called

In Claudine Verheggen (ed.), Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language at 40. New York,: Cambridge University Press (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Kripke finds in Wittgenstein an argument for the view that there is no such thing as meaning. A key premise in that argument is that there are semantic norms—norms governing the uses of expressions that hold in virtue of what those expressions mean. Standardly, those norms are understood to be norms of truth—roughly, they permit truly applying expressions and prohibit falsely applying them. An increasing number of philosophers reject the standard interpretation. In this paper, I explore alternative construals due to Alan Millar and Indrek Reiland and argue that they are either unmotivated or not competitors with the standard account. In doing so, I defend a kind of pluralism about semantic normativity. If there are norms of truth that hold in virtue of what expressions mean, there will be further norms that make reference to the doxastic, epistemic, and motivational states of language-users, norms that are explanatory posterior to the norms of truth.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,667

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The structure of semantic norms.Jeffrey Kaplan - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (4):373-391.
Semantic Realism and the Argument from Motivational Internalism.Alexander Miller - 2012 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 345-362.
The Argument From Queerness and the Normativity of Meaning.Alexander Miller - 2010 - In Martin Grajner & Adolf Rami (eds.), Wahrheit, Bedeutung, Existenz. Ontos. pp. 107-124.
Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):94-110.
Grounds of Semantic Normativity.Diego Marconi - 2022 - Philosophical Topics 50 (1):161-184.
Kripke’s Normativity Argument.José L. Zalabardo - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):467-488.
Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.
Use theories of meaning.Marc Staudacher - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Amsterdam

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-07-15

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Daniel Whiting
University of Southampton

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references