Lewis, Causality, and Possible Worlds

Dialectica 54 (2):133-137 (2000)
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David Lewis' account of counterfactuals is based on a relation of comparative similarity between possible worlds. We investigate what this relation might amount to in the case where the possible worlds are trajectories of dynamic systems: for most dynamic systems, there are unexpected difficulties in defining the sort of relation that Lewis requires. The difficulties are related to a pervasive, but counter-intuitive, feature of dynamic systems called non-integrability.



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Graham White
Queen Mary University of London

Citations of this work

Causality, Modality, and Explanation.Graham White - 2008 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (3):313-343.

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References found in this work

Philosophical Papers.Graeme Forbes & David Lewis - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):108.
Page 163, lines 15-upB should be.David Lewis - 1994 - Philosophical Papers 72 (1).

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