Impersonal Friends

The Monist 74 (1):3-29 (1991)
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Abstract

The rationality of concern for oneself has been taken for granted by the authors of western moral and political thought in a way in which the rationality of concern for others has not. While various authors have differed about the morality of self-concern, and about the extent to which such concern is rationally required, few have doubted that we have at least some special reasons to care for our selves, reasons that differ either in degree or in kind from those we have to care for others. The rationality of prudence as traditionally conceived was thus taken to be threatened by Lockean accounts of personal identity. For taking a person’s identity through time to consist in psychological continuity is often thought to result in the numerical distinctness of his present and future selves, thus leaving his present self in the unsavoury position of having to ask, “Why care specially about my future self, if he won’t really be me?”

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Jennifer Whiting
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

Vices of Friendship.Arina Pismenny & Berit Brogaard - 2022 - In Arina Pismenny & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Love. Lanham, MD 20706, USA: pp. 231-253.
Justifying Partiality.Errol Lord - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):569-590.
Love.Bennett W. Helm - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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