Emotion as the categorical basis for moral thought

Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):533-553 (2018)
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Abstract

I offer and develop an original answer to the question of whether emotion plays an important role in the formation of moral thought. In a nutshell, my answer will be that if motivational internalism provides us with a correct description of the nature of moral thought, then emotion plays an important role because emotion is required to explain or ground the behavioral dispositions that are involved in moral thought.

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Demian Whiting
University of Hull

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