Causal nominalism

In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ; (2009)
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Abstract

The causal theory of properties is standardly combined with a realist's ontology of universals or tropes. In this paper, I consider an uncharted alternative – a nominalist causal theory of properties. I discuss advantages and disadvantages of the resulting theory of properties, and explore the Rylean understanding of causal powers that emerges.

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Ann Whittle
University of Manchester

Citations of this work

Non‐Humean theories of natural necessity.Tyler Hildebrand - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (5):e12662.
Platonic Dispositionalism.Matthew Tugby - 2013 - Mind 122 (486):fzt071.
Grounding theories of powers.Matthew Tugby - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11187-11216.
Hylomorphism reconditioned.Michael C. Rea - 2011 - Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):341-358.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.

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