Abstract

After the cessation of conflict the majority of those involved in violations of international law will not be held criminally accountable. Rather, it is frequently the case that the bulk of perpetrators receive amnesty. Often, consequentialist considerations weigh heavily on the decision to grant amnesty. For instance, amnesties may be offered in order to generate aggregate security benefits in volatile post-conflict settings. My contention is that states cannot morally justify amnesties by appealing solely to the aggregate benefits they are expected to deliver. The moral objection concerns the distribution of associated costs, where such costs include the risk of re-offense that amnesty generates. Importantly, these costs may be unevenly imposed onto the society. This means that certain citizens will expect to bear individual losses greater than any gains the amnesty can deliver to them. Those placed at a net-disadvantage can object that amnesties are morally unjustifiable: they impose unreasonable burdens on them in order to secure benefits for others. However, as amnesties are often vital to achieve peace there remain strong pragmatic reasons to favour limited prosecutions. Given these concerns it is necessary to justify the differential imposition of cost associated with amnesties. I argue that ex ante contractualism, as a theory of moral justification, is well-suited to this task. According to this framework amnesties are justified only if no individual could reasonably reject the associated burdens. By developing a non-aggregative justification of amnesty this account offers a novel approach to the design and implementation of post-conflict prosecutorial strategies.