Abstract

A radical concept of power identifies social processes which (whether as ?ideology?, ?false consciousness?, or ?the spectacle') influence people's actions by moulding their beliefs or desires. However, seeing people as deluded is to risk treating them as less than fully autonomous beings. Despite his libertarian intentions, Lukes fails to guard against this paternalistic implication. His view still implies that it is the social critic who is in the best position to identify the real interests of an oppressed group. Here it is argued that power should be conceived as an intrusion on the ?formative practices? of people. It is possible to identify power as an unwanted influence on the processes in which people ?form and discover? interests, while maintaining that interests can only be self?ascribed. This solution requires a concept of formation as both irreducibly social and yet potentially free. Neither Foucault nor Habermas can provide such a solution, despite some valuable insights. In the end, we must look at the influences of power on formative practices which are actual rather than idealized, productive rather than reflective, and which involve the whole person rather than merely the intellect