Abstract

The subject of this paper is the relation of human ratio and divine intellectus as understood by Boethius and Valla. In Consolatio Philosophiae Boethius constructs the notion of divine intellectus and uses it to identify the inferior human ratio. Lorenzo Valla in De libero arbitrio disqualifies Boethius’ approach as irrational. At first glance, Valla’s critique of Boethius seems to make the very mistake Valla is up to criticise in Boethius. Just like Boethius himself, Valla runs the risk of hubris. Just like Boethius, when reasoning about the divine intellectus Valla seems to extend human reasoning far beyond the limited ratio. I contend that when presupposing a sharp distinction between ratio and intellectus – as both Boethius and Valla do – statements about the divine intellectus can only be rationally constructed as statements on the level of metalanguage. Along these lines, I suggest an interpretation of Valla’s critique that is not subject to the very same objection he raises against Boethius