(Dis)continuism and mechanisms

Abstract

Today’s philosophers of memory are split between continuists, who claim that episodic memory (EM) and imagination (EI) belong to the same natural kind, and discontinuists, who defend that they don’t. This abstract considers how assumptions about which mechanisms are relevant for natural kindness shape this discussion. If the argument is in the right track, the (dis)continuism debate should be characterized as a verbal dispute about the important mechanisms for EM and EI.

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Matheus Diesel Werberich
Washington University in St. Louis

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