History and Philosophy of Logic 12 (2):167-183 (1991)
AbstractThe relation between Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics and mathematical Intuitionism has raised a considerable debate. My attempt is to analyse if there is a commitment in Wittgenstein to themes characteristic of the intuitionist movement in Mathematics and if that commitment is one important strain that runs through his Remarks on the foundations of mathematics. The intuitionistic themes to analyse in his philosophy of mathematics are: firstly, his attacks on the unrestricted use of the Law of Excluded Middle; secondly, his distrust of non-constructive proofs; and thirdly, his impatience with the idea that mathematics stands in need of a foundation. These elements are Fogelin's starting point for the systematic reconstruction of Wittgenstein's conception of mathematics
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References found in this work
From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931.Jean van Heijenoort (ed.) - 1967 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work
From the Characterization of ‘European Philosophy of Science’ to the Case of Philosophy of the Social Sciences.Wenceslao J. Gonzalez - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (2):167-188.
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