Abstract

Aldo Leopold's holistic land ethic principle, ‘‘a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community … wrong when it tends otherwise,’’ has seemed to many philosophers indefensible in light of any of the traditional normative theories of character and conduct that have been central to Western moral theory since the early modern period. J. Baird Callicott has long disputed this assessment, arguing that in fact, Leopold's land ethic is best understood and defended as the conclusion from the application of an essentially Humean moral outlook to the human exploitation of nature. Callicot'ts defense of Leopold's land ethic has been criticized for being grounded in an interpretation of Hume's moral philosophy that the texts do not support. But while the criticisms pose a serious obstacle to acceptance of Callicott's own strategy for constructing a Humean defense of Leopold's position, they leave open the possibility that other strategies might prove more successful. There are at least two ways that a more successful defense could be constructed. The attitude toward nature encapsulated in Leopold's land ethic principle could either be defended as an inborn, natural virtue or, alternately, as a novel species of artificial virtue inculcated for its personal and social utility. If this correct, Callicott's suggestion that we look to Hume for a defense of Leopold's position merits serious consideration, both for the light it may shed on the particular question of the defensibility of Leopold's land ethic principle and on more general questions about whether Hume's virtue theory can be a useful resource for ethical and social policy debates about the environment.