Equal Opportunity and Newcomb’s Problem

Mind 128 (510):429-457 (2019)
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Abstract

The 'Why ain'cha rich?' argument for one-boxing in Newcomb's problem allegedly vindicates evidential decision theory and undermines causal decision theory. But there is a good response to the argument on behalf of causal decision theory. I develop this response. Then I pose a new problem and use it to give a new 'Why ain'cha rich?' argument. Unlike the old argument, the new argument targets evidential decision theory. And unlike the old argument, the new argument is sound.

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Author's Profile

Ian Wells
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Riches and Rationality.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):114-129.
Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology.Ru Ye - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):157-175.
Rational monism and rational pluralism.Jack Spencer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1769-1800.
Instrumental Divergence.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-27.
Normative Decision Theory.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):755-772.

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References found in this work

The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Causal decision theory.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.
Rational Decision and Causality.Ellery Eells - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.

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