The place of time in cognition

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):87-105 (2004)
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Abstract

models of cognition are essentially incomplete because they fail to capture the temporal properties of mental processing. I present two possible interpretations of the dynamicists' argument from time and show that neither one is successful. The disagreement between dynamicists and symbolic theorists rests not on temporal considerations per se, but on differences over the multiple realizability of cognitive states and the proper explanatory goals of psychology. The negative arguments of dynamicists against symbolic models fail, and it is doubtful whether pursuing dynamicists' explanatory goals will lead to a robust psychological theory. Introduction Elements of the symbolic theory Elements of dynamical systems theory The argument from time 4.1 First interpretation of the argument from time 4.2 Second interpretation of the argument from time Limits of dynamical systems theory

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Daniel Weiskopf
Georgia State University

Citations of this work

The computational theory of mind.Steven Horst - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Resilience of Computationalism.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):852-861.
Discussions dynamical explanation in cognitive science.Keld Stehr Nielsen - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (1):139-163.

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References found in this work

Troubles with functionalism.Ned Block - 1978 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.
On the proper treatment of connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.
Multiple realizations.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):635-654.

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