The mind doesn't work that way: The scope and limits of computational psychology

Abstract

Over the last quarter century or so, no one has done more to shape debate in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science than Jerry Fodor. He is best known for championing the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), the view that thinking consists of computations over syntactically structured mental representations (Fodor, 1975). He has also developed the idea that the mind is partially made up of isolated mechanisms called “modules” that employ innate databases informationally encapsulated from the rest of the mind (Fodor, 1983).

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