The impossibility of interpersonal utility comparisons: A critical note

Mind 105 (420):661-665 (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Hausman has recently provided an argument against identifying well-being with preference-satisfaction. I will focus on two of his premises. Hausman’s arguments for the first, I will suggest, fail. If the third premise is correct, I shall then argue, it can be used to undermine other plausible conceptions of the good.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,385

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
112 (#157,952)

6 months
26 (#139,415)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ruth Weintraub
Tel Aviv University

Citations of this work

Worlds, Capabilities and Well-Being.H. E. Baber - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (4):377-392.
Transcendental arguments and interpersonal utility comparisons.Mauro Rossi - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (3):273-295.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references