Mind 105 (420):661-665 (1996)

Hausman has recently provided an argument against identifying well-being with preference-satisfaction. I will focus on two of his premises. Hausman’s arguments for the first, I will suggest, fail. If the third premise is correct, I shall then argue, it can be used to undermine other plausible conceptions of the good.
Keywords interpersonal  utility  comparisons
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DOI 10.1093/mind/105.420.661
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Worlds, Capabilities and Well-Being.H. E. Baber - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (4):377-392.
Transcendental Arguments and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons.Mauro Rossi - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (3):273-295.

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