Psychological determinism and rationality

Erkenntnis 43 (1):67-79 (1995)
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  There are arguments which purport to rebut psychological determinism by appealing to its alleged incompatibility with rationality. I argue that they all fail. Against Davidson, I argue that rationality does not preclude the existence of psychological laws. Against Popper, I argue that rationality is compatible with the possibility of predicting human actions. Against Schlesinger, I claim that Newcomb's problem cannot be invoked to show that human actions are unpredictable. Having vindicated the possibility of a rationally-based theory of action, I consider the form it might take



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Ruth Weintraub
Tel Aviv University

Citations of this work

Be Careful what you Wish for: Acceptance of Laplacean Determinism Commits One to Belief in Precognition.Stan Klein - 2024 - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 11 (1):19–29.

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References found in this work

A treatise of human nature.David Hume & D. G. C. Macnabb (eds.) - 1977 - New York: Dutton.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Judgement and justification.William G. Lycan - 1988 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The poverty of historicism.Karl Raimund Popper - 1957 - London,: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

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