Pretense as alternative sense-making: a praxeological enactivist account

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1-26 (2021)
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Abstract

The project of this paper is to synthesize enactivist cognitive science and practice theory in order to develop a new account of pretend play. Pretend play is usually conceived of as a representationalist phenomenon where a pretender projects a fictional mental representation onto reality. It thus seems that pretense can only be explained in representationalist terms. In this paper, we oppose this usual approach. We instead propose not only new explanatory tools for pretend play, but also a fundamental reconceptualization of the phenomena of pretend play, that is, of the very explanandum of theories of pretense. To do so, we suggest combining the turn to action and embodiment in the cognitive sciences with the practice turn in the humanities. From our point of view, pretend play has to be seen in its role in human life as a whole, which is to help children to learn to master the complex sociocultural contingencies of the manifold social practices that make up social reality. Pretend play should therefore be conceived as alternative sense-making that is always related, in varying ways, to ordinary social practices. Pretenders do not need to project mental representations onto reality, but make sense of their surroundings in different ways than encultured adults in ordinary practices. In the paper, we spell out this view and show how it enables an enactivist reconceptualization of imagination, intentions and knowledge, which are usually thought of as being available only to representationalist accounts of pretense.

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Author Profiles

Zuzanna Rucinska
University of Antwerp
Martin Weichold
Universität Regensburg

Citations of this work

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Praxeological Enactivism vs. Radical Enactivism: Reply to Hutto.Martin Weichold & Zuzanna Rucińska - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1177-1182.

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