Explanations and their justifications

Philosophy of Science 28 (3):300-305 (1961)
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Criticism of the deductive model of explanation continues. In a recent article, “Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanations,” Professor Michael Scriven hangs a great many critical points from the distinction between explanations and their justifications. I should like to examine his proposal with a view to showing that in so far as this distinction can be made, it cannot be used as a basis of criticisms of the deductive or covering law model, as it was originally outlined by Professor Carl G. Hempel.



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