Philosophy of Science 28 (3):300-305 (1961)
AbstractCriticism of the deductive model of explanation continues. In a recent article, “Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanations,” Professor Michael Scriven hangs a great many critical points from the distinction between explanations and their justifications. I should like to examine his proposal with a view to showing that in so far as this distinction can be made, it cannot be used as a basis of criticisms of the deductive or covering law model, as it was originally outlined by Professor Carl G. Hempel.
Similar books and articles
Infinite Systems in SM Explanations: Thermodynamic Limit, Renormalization (Semi-) Groups, and Irreversibility.Chuang Liu - 2001 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S325-.
Scientific Explanation: A Critical Survey.Gerhard Schurz - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (3):429-465.
Non‐Committal Causal Explanations.David Pineda - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):147-170.
The Role of Unification in Explanations of Facts.Erik Weber, Jeroen Van Bouwel & Merel Lefevere - 2010 - In Henk de Regt, Samir Okasha & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer.
The Logical Skeleton of Darwin's Historical Methodology.Mary B. Williams - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:514 - 521.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads